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Abstract
The paper investigates the importance of banks’ business classification in shaping the risk
profile of financial institutions on a global scale. We employ a rare-event logit model based
on a state-of-the-art list of major global distress events from the global financial crisis. When
clustering banks by their business strategies using a community detection approach, we
show that (i) capital enhanced resilience only for traditional banks that were on average less
capitalized than other banks; (ii) boosting ROE, usually associated with riskier exposures,
improved resilience for stable funded and asset diversified banks; (iii) conversely, higher
levels of ROA exacerbated banks’ vulnerability when associated with concentrated (not-
diversified) investment structures; (iv) size in terms of total assets contributed to instability
only for wholesale-funded institutions due to their high levels of unstable funding. Liquidity,
on the contrary, reduced the institution likelihood of being in distress, regardless of its business
classification. Although our findings refer to the recent financial crisis, they provide evidence
that a tailored risk monitoring based on a proper peer group identification can facilitate banks’
distresses prediction.
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1 Introduction
The transition from traditional to modern banking with the implementation of the so-called
“universal banking model”1 allowed banks to expand, over the past three decades, their tradi-
tional and specialized business strategies to a wider range of products and services, including
security/investment banking and wholesale-debt. Hence, the constellation of possible com-
binations of asset-liability choices at the banks disposal makes the classification of their
business strategies a complex task. This ultimately limits the ability of regulators to tailor
risk monitoring to the specific vulnerability of each strategy to distress.2
Although there is no strong evidence to support the claim that universal banks are riskier
than specialized ones (Benston 1994; Cornett et al. 2002; Dietrich and Vollmer 2012; Curi
et al. 2015), some studies (e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2010; Lozano-Vivas and
Pasiouras 2010) show a non-monotonic impact of non-traditional funding-investment mod-
els on risk. Starting from low level of non-deposit funding in combination with non-interest
income activities, these non-traditional banking strategies provide risk diversification bene-
fits, whereas further increases in the level of this mix amplify bank fragility.3 Consider for
example the impact of leverage growth, that is typically associated with a higher level of
risk. On one side, leverage could improve resilience for deposit-funded banks as it will boost
their stable funding. On the other side, it could also increase bank vulnerability if associated
with a very specialized investment strategy that suffers from the lack of diversification. The
universal model offers better diversification opportunities that usually facilitate resilience
(Dietrich and Vollmer 2012), although sources of funding towards wholesale-debt tend to
exacerbate distress during market crisis due to the low levels of stable funding.
This paper relates to the growing debate on the importance of banks business model
classification and its impact on performance and risk (Hryckiewicz and Kozłowski 2017;
Martin-Oliver et al. 2017; Lucas et al. 2018). We focus on the interplay between assets
and liabilities to propose the detection of stylized banking business strategies, which are
interpreted as the combinations of funding and investment choices that unravel the core
drivers of their business models.
To classify banks into strategy groups according to their business features, we implement
a clustering technique designed for high-dimensional and sparse data sets, like accounting-
based data. Then, we test whether those competitive business strategies identified by the
clustering detection are exposed to different risk drivers. Finally, we provide insights on
how to accurately signal business strategy instability. We are interested in exposing the
vulnerability of banking business strategies to the likelihood of distress, which can help
regulators to design ex-ante solutions to restore resilience.
1 This model was formally introduced in the EU by the Second Banking Directive in 1992, in the US via
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 and in Japan by the “Japanese Big Bang” financial reforms in 1990s
(Casu et al. 2015; Hoshi and Kashyap 1999). Banks operating in emerging markets have also been subject to
widespread financial deregulation and innovation that have impacted their business strategies as shown e.g. in
Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001).
2 The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) put in place in Europe (EBA 2014) is a direct exam-
ple of incorporating business models characteristics for accurate banks’ peer group analysis as an important
pillar for monitoring the banking sector’s stability and soundness.
3 Even though risk diversification can be beneficial at the institution level to reduce its probability of default,
diversification at a large scale could eventually increase the similarity among institutions, increasing the
probability of joint failures with dangerous systemic consequences (Wagner 2010). The so-called dark side of
diversification can be avoided by securitization, offering non-linear diversification strategies via tranches of
portfolio investments (van Oordt 2013).
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Using a large set of bank level indicators of business strategies from 2005 to 2014, we
identify three dominant and very popular peer groups each corresponding to a combination
of business strategies that were stable over the whole period under investigation. The first,
labelled A, is characterized by a universal banking model with dominant wholesale funding
and diversified loans investments. Group B is an hybrid model that combines wholesale
funding from modern banking with specialized investments in commercial loans, common
in traditional banking. Group C follows a traditional banking model focused on deposit
funding and commercial loans investments. Two other groups, less popular than the three
core ones, were also available prior to the financial crisis, named D and E . The former
resembles group C with more long-term wholesale funding, whereas the latter is another
hybrid model with wholesale funding and specialized investments in retail loans.4
We then test whether the identified peer groups show different risk drivers during the
recent global financial crisis. Due to the magnitude of the 2008 financial crisis, we construct
a global distress events list by merging signals regarding bankruptcies and liquidations,
defaults, distressed mergers and public bailouts. We then follow the literature (see e.g., Betz
et al. 2014; Vazquez and Federico 2015) which examine the impact of these major events
and regress them against financial ratios after controlling for macro and sectoral effects, but
differently from previous works we apply a rare-event logit model to take into account the
possibility of a small amount of distress events compared to the size of the sample.
Although all groups were prone to the risk of distress at the outbreak of the financial crisis,
we find different risk drivers when controlling for strategy group membership. The size of the
institution (see e.g., Wang 2015), measured in terms of total assets, is positively related to the
likelihood of distress only in the wholesale-funded groups, suggesting a higher vulnerability
of large institutions adopting strategies with a much lower proportion of stable funding than
the deposit-oriented group. Higher capital over total assets, i.e. lower leverage, contributes
to limit the likelihood of distress only for deposit-funded banks. Besides, in our sample
these latter appear less capitalized on average than wholesale-funded banks, suggesting that
recapitalizations had a relatively limited impact on those modern banks that, due to their
risky exposures, were already holding comparatively higher levels of capital.
However, changes in leverage can directly affect ROA and ROE, with indirect conse-
quences to bank resilience. When looking at those drivers individually, we observe that ROA
impacted positively the risk of distress for deposit-funded groups, and negatively for the
wholesale ones. This implies that the limited assets diversification strategies of the tradi-
tional deposit-funded institutions can force them to concentrate their investments on fewer
products in the pursuit of higher assets returns, generating an overall riskier profile compared
to the wholesale-funded groups. In contrast, results for ROE suggest that leverage may inten-
sify stable funding in the case of deposit-funded groups, hence improving their resilience,
while wholesale-funded groups would pay the price of more unstable non-deposit funding
growth in the pursuit of higher ROE. The notable exception is liquidity, whose impact on the
risk of distress is significantly negative and this result is consistent across all business models.
This suggests a positive contribution of liquidity to resilience which appears exogenous to
the strategy group choice (Tirole 2011). Overall, although the above evidence refers to the
period of the global financial crisis, it lends support to our premises that a targeted policy
intervention based on business strategy classification may facilitate the prediction of banks’
distress.
4 Finally, two remaining post crisis groups, labelled F and G, identify a deposit-funded strategy with diversi-
fied loan investments and an investment banking model with both high non-deposit funding and non-interest
based investments, respectively. Note that the empirical exercise in this study focuses on the pre-crisis strategies
only, therefore results for these post-crisis groups are available from the authors upon request.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature on banks’
business models classification. Section 3 describes the data sources and main methodological
issues, including the construction of our global distress event list and the empirical design.
Section 4 presents the cluster approach, validation and the economic features of banks’ peer
groups. Results are discussed in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The worst crisis since the Great Depression started roughly two decades after deregulation and
financial innovation allowed banks to strategically move from traditional to modern banking.
This resulted, among other things, in banks being able to offer a wider range of products and
services, hedge derivatives and securitise. Individual banks, however, adapted their strategies
to different extent depending on a variety of factors, including their ownership structures, size
and risk culture. This paper sets out to determine the resilience of alternative banks’ business
models appropriately identified using a large global sample and an indirect classification
approach. This is a particularly useful analysis for the identification of early warning signals
and the prediction of bank distress. The present study contributes to two strands of literature:
the first is on clustering techniques and their applications to the banking sector to identify
dominant business strategies (Sect. 2.1); and the second one is on the relationship between
banks’ business models and risk drivers (Sect. 2.2).
2.1 Selected review of clustering approaches to detect banks’business strategies
In the literature it is possible to identify two main clustering approaches to derive peer banks
groups: (i) a direct, qualitative, approach, provided by the institutions themselves and based
for example on bank characteristics such as being listed, mutual and so on5; and (ii) an
indirect, quantitative, approach that relies on hierarchical clustering methods.6 This latter
classification is known as the “Ward’s method” and employs the Ward (1963)’s procedure
to form and identify the distance between the clusters, and includes a stopping rule on the
number of clusters based on Calin´ski and Harabasz (1974).
Literature based on the well-known Ward approach exploits balance sheet variables (Ayadi
et al. 2011; Roengpitya et al. 2014; Martin-Oliver et al. 2017) to detect similarities and create
homogeneous peer groups. These studies test several combinations of assets and liabilities
items to characterize banking activities and use Euclidean distances to measure how similar
financial institutions are with respect to these dimensions over which banks are supposed
to have a direct influence. Income statements characteristics are usually excluded from peer
group assessment and identification.7 This is because they tend to reflect the interaction
between the institution and the market, so they are not under a strong direct control of the
5 Bankscope, for instance, distinguishes between 16 main groups/specializations including for example: Bank
Holding and Holding Companies, Cooperative Banks, Finance Companies (Credit Card, Factoring and Leas-
ing), Investment Banks, Islamic Banks, Micro-Financing Institutions Private Banking and Asset Management
Companies, Real Estate and Mortgage Bank, Savings Bank and Securities Firm.
6 Clustering methods are also used for outlier detection as, for instance, in Duan et al. (2009).
7 An exception is presented in Puliga et al. (2016).
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institution itself. Those characteristics are, however, part of the CAMELS rating framework
used by supervisors to capture banks’ overall risk condition.8
The direct approach has been used in number of studies, such as Demirgüc-Kunt and
Huizinga (2010), and more recently (Köhler 2015). These authors document evidence of a
non-monotonic effect of non-traditional banking activities to risk employing a direct classifi-
cation of listed versus unlisted banks. The narrow focus of these studies on the identification
of banks’ business models motivates our goal to go beyond the usual distinction based on
ownership structure and extend the sample to all global institutions for which relevant data
are available.
An indirect classification of large EU banks is provided by e.g. Roengpitya et al. (2014) and
Ayadi and De Groen (2015). The latter study finds clear distinctions between retail-oriented
models, characterized by the traditional customer deposit-loan intermediation activity (with
different levels of diversification among the groups they identify) and the wholesale and
investment models. For these latter, the non-traditional banking activities show a heavy
reliance on either interbank lending and funding (wholesale), or trading assets and derivatives
(investment). In terms of overall risk profile, retail-oriented models show higher distance to
default (measured by the z-score.)9 Our classification resembles the models seen above, and
provides additional contribution to the literature by extending the sample on a global basis
and benefiting from a considerably larger sample coverage (see Sect. 4).
Using a narrow list of balance sheets variables, Roengpitya et al. (2014) implement a
similar indirect approach on a sample of top international banks, along with some subjective
judgmental elements to filter the final groups. They found three prevailing models adopted
globally: retail-funded, wholesale-funded and trading. Retail and wholesale funded models
are found to perform better during the period 2006–2014 than trading model, while retail
banks show more volatility in their performance compared to wholesale institutions. The
same cluster analysis is also performed by Martin-Oliver et al. (2017) to investigate the
banking crisis in Spain across institutions with different business models, ownership and
governance features.
Alternative approaches to business model classifications adopt time series clustering as
proposed by Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016) and, more recently, Lucas et al. (2018).10
Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016) propose a continuous type classification method to
discover peer groups by employing a factor analysis. However, this approach only provides
a description of the peer groups that better explain the variables set without a direct link
to the individual institutions adopting that business model. This is an important limitation
that would make any direct intervention by the regulators problematic. Lucas et al. (2018)
identify six main dimensions characterizing banks’ business models: size, funding, activity,
complexity, geography and ownership. Their advantage compared to cross-sectional setups
lies on the ability to control for both cross-section and time varying properties of business
models. However, their approach is limited to the dynamics of the clusters overtime with
8 CAMELS refers to the six components of a bank’s rating system originally developed by US supervisors.
It is an acronym that reflects an institution’s overall condition, namely: Capital adequacy, Asset quality,
Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk (see, for more details, Sect. 3.1). For instance,
Cole and White (2012) provide one of the first attempts to study US banks’ failures using CAMELS proxies.
9 The z-score is a measure of “distance to insolvency” often used in banking studies, that combines accounting
measures of profitability, leverage and volatility. It reflects the number of standard deviations by which returns
would have to fall from the mean to wipe out bank equity and is calculated as the sum of equity to total assets
and return on average assets (ROAA) scaled by the standard deviation of ROAA.
10 For optimization literature and use of classifiers systems for bankruptcy prediction, see Ouenniche et al.
(2019).
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a static composition. This means that institutions are assumed to adopt the same business
model over time. Although banks tend to have stable business models, the transition between
models is an important indicator of fragility that needs to be considered for accurate risk
assessment.
We employ the indirect approach using the Louvain method of community detection (Blon-
del et al. 2008) that preserves the individual bank classification features and is specifically
designed for large, sparse and complex data sets. We also advance on the accuracy of model
specifications, which is usually considered a strong point in factor analysis, by relying on a
state-of-the-art set of individual bank characteristics on a large sample. Specifically, in this
paper we focus on three dimensions to characterize the business strategy of a bank, namely:
funding sources, investment activities and the complexity of the strategy. As shown in the
methodological section, we also employ a very granular list of bank characteristics.
2.2 Selected literature on the determinants of bank distress
There is abundant literature on the balance sheet determinants of bank distress. However, most
studies tend to underestimate the importance of defining appropriately business strategies in
assessing this relationship. Among the most typical variables that are found to be significantly
associated with distress in recent studies are: leverage and capital, liquidity and size.
With emphasis on regulatory capital requirements and liquidity buffers, Vazquez and
Federico (2015) claim that high leveraged banks with weak structural liquidity were more
likely to default during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The authors’ list of distress events
consider the entire set of mergers, while in our study we concentrate on a narrow definition
of distressed mergers (Sect. 3.3.1), as also suggested by Betz et al. (2014). Similar findings
are reported in Beltratti and Stultz (2012): banks with lower leverage, higher regulatory
capital and deposits showed more resilience to distress compared with those high leveraged
institutions financed on short-term money markets. Although their analysis covers the pre-
crisis period and only a relatively small sample of banks, they provide a detailed discussion on
the resiliance of banks’ peer groups based on the mix of asset-liability structures compatible
with the universal banking model. Their contribution inspired the set-up for our signal models
detailed in Sect. 3.3. The data sample constructed in our study is closely related to Vazquez
and Federico (2015) in terms of number of institutions and countries’ coverage.
Betz et al. (2014) focus more on the predictability of banks’ vulnerability by designing an
early warning model for the largest European banks. Using CAMELS rating system as main
descriptive elements of banks’ risk drivers (see Footnote 8), they develop a signal model
on the distress events during the financial crisis by combining both direct bank failures
(bankruptcies, liquidations and defaults) with indirect events like state support of distressed
institutions and mergers in distress. They show that CAMELS are good indicators of bank
distress and that macro-financial imbalances and sectoral indices of vulnerability improve
the performance of model predictability. Our study is closely related to Betz et al. (2014)
in terms of the use of CAMELS variables as risk drivers and the enlarged set of distress
events. Demyanyk and Hasan (2010) offer a detailed review of these models. In our analysis
we enrich the data sets described above by considering a larger global sample of banks with
a more comprehensive distress events list. Recent work by Mousavi and Ouenniche (2018)
provide a useful comparison of corporate distress predictions models.
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3 Data andmethodology
3.1 Data
To carry out the classification of banks’ peer groups, we employ data for the immediate
pre-crisis period (2005–2007) drawn from the international database Bankscope. We select
this specific interval because of data coverage11 and to ensure some homogeneity in terms of
accounting practices among sampled banks, as the International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS) became compulsory in Europe for all publicly listed institutions in 2005. In
addition, for robustness we extend the classification analysis to 2014 (see Appendix E). To
investigate the presence of similarities across institutions in different countries, we consider
a global sample covering about 180 countries, of which more than a hundred have at least 10
institutions. Our classification procedure is intended to overcome some of the potential limits
due to broad classifications. For this reason, we include all types of peer groups available in
Bankscope, except for Central Banks and Specialized Governmental Credit Institutions.
The procedure used to identify peer groups of banks with similar business strategies relies
on the characterization of financial institutions by means of balance sheet items. The choice to
discard income statement variables is in line with previous literature (e.g., Ayadi et al. 2011;
Roengpitya et al. 2014) and reflects the need to identify economic dimensions over which
financial institutions can have a direct influence. In our study we exploit a detailed set of
balance sheet items for both assets and liabilities, providing a very granular representation of
banking activities. The universal model framework has been used to select the list of variables
that better represents the main classification of traditional versus modern banking, specifically
deposits versus wholesale-debt (from interbank to long term borrowing) on the liability
side and traditional versus non-traditional investments (from retail and commercial loans
to modern interbank lending and non-interest based investments) on the asset side. Table 1
reports summary statistics of the balance sheet variables used to compute the similarities
across financial institutions. The business strategy group detection is done for each year from
2005 to 2014 separately. From the set of institutions to be classified each year, we exclude
institutions for which we have less than 1/3 of the selected balance sheet items. To avoid
distortions across different sized banks in our global sample, we express each measure as a
percentage of the respective total assets.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, to gauge banks’ probability of distress we use
a wide set of predictors retrieved from several sources. Following the extant literature (see
e.g., Flannery 1998; González-Hermosillo 1999), bank-specific features can be expressed in
terms of proxies for CAMELS variables, representing our theoretical framework for selecting
risk drivers. This representation helps the supervisory authority to identify institutions that
need attention. Individual banks’ data to construct the CAMELS rating on overall banks’
stability are extracted from Bankscope.
In addition, we consider a set of country specific controls for the financial sector as well as
macroeconomic conditions (see e.g., Betz et al. 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2005;
Vazquez and Federico 2015). Since our data set is characterized by a broad classification of
financial institutions, we represent the financial sector using a range of variables from classic
banking sector indicators (e.g., aggregate non-performing loans to gross loans) to market
measures (e.g., the financial sector market returns). Data are retrieved from BIS, Datastream,
11 This is particularly important for the clustering analysis because the selection of balance sheet items aims
at preserving a balanced representation of both the assets and the liabilities sides, opting for those variables
with the highest coverage among financial institutions.
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Table 1 Balance sheet variables statistics Column Annual Average refers to the average across annual mean
values from 2005 to 2014; column Std (Annual Average) shows the standard deviation of annual mean values;
column Pool Average indicates the average when observations are pooled across the entire interval 2005–2014;
column Pool Std stands for the standard deviation of pooled data; column Annual Average NAs exhibits the
average number of missing values computed across annual mean values. Source: Bankscope, authors’ own
elaborations
Balance sheet items Annual average SD Pool average Pool SD Annual NAs
At-equity investments in associates 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 3211.60
Available for sale securities 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.13 4563.20
Cash and due from banks 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.09 218.30
Corporate and commercial loans 0.24 0.03 0.23 0.25 4688.80
Customer deposits (current) 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.24 2548.20
Customer deposits (savings) 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.19 5895.00
Customer deposits (term) 0.28 0.02 0.28 0.25 2551.30
Deposits from banks 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.17 2579.90
Derivatives 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 7004.50
Fixed assets 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 125.40
Held to maturity securities 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.09 6975.30
Loans and advances to banks 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.17 952.30
Other assets 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08 16.10
Other consumer/retail loans 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.21 7073.20
Other deposits and short-term borrowings 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.17 4854.10
Other funding 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.11 7798.10
Other liabilities 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.50 625.80
Other loans 0.38 0.03 0.37 0.32 1428.50
Other mortgage loans 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.16 9816.60
Other securities 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.15 4641.70
Repos and cash collateral 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.14 9295.20
Reserves for impaired loans 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.18 2819.50
Reserves for pensions and other 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 3765.70
Residential mortgage loans 0.29 0.06 0.27 0.25 7453.40
Reverse repos and cash collateral 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.12 9229.50
Senior debt maturing after 1 year 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.22 5749.00
Subordinated borrowing 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 5901.00
Total equity 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.59 607.30
Trading securities and at FV through income 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.11 4829.70
The average number of institutions per year is about 10,400. Data for each institution are standardized by the
respective total assets
OECD and World Bank. Table 2 provides the full list and the specific data sources. Table 10
in Appendix B shows that, with only a few exceptions, correlations among predictors do
not exhibit relevant and significant relationships over the period 2005–2007. However, we
present different specifications of the baseline model for risk assessment, where we basically
test different subsets of predictors to overcome potential issues related to multicollinearity.
Results are reported in Appendix F.
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Table 2 Measures, data description and sources This table shows for each predictor its definition and the
source from which we retrieved data
Measures Description Source
Capital Equity/total assets Bankscope
Capital funding ratio (Common equity + subordinated borrowing)/total assets Bankscope
ROA Return on average assets Bankscope
ROE Return on average equity Bankscope
Cost to income ratio Operating expenses/operating income Bankscope
Net interest margin Net interest revenues/total earning assets Bankscope
Interest expenses to Total interest expenses/total liabilities Bankscope
Total liabilities
Liquid assets to short (Cash and other liquid assets)/(Deposits and ST Funding) Bankscope
Term funding
Deposits to total funding (Deposits and ST Funding)/Total funding Bankscope
Total securities to total Total securities/total assets Bankscope
Assets
GDP per capita Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita World Bank
Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) World Bank
House price Real house prices OECD/BIS
Unemployment Share of the labor force that is without work but available World Bank
for and seeking employment
FDI-Inflows Net inflows (% of GDP) World Bank
FDI-Outflows Net outflows (% of GDP) World Bank
Central Gvt. Debt Entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual World Bank
obligations (% of GDP) World Bank
Gvt. long-term yield Long-term government bond yield Datastream
Banks NPLs to Gross Domestic financial sector nonperforming loans divided by World Bank
Loans the total value of the loan portfolio
Credit to Non-fin Sector Banks domestic credit to non-financial sector BIS
Market Index S&P Global equity indices (annual % change) or, World Bank/
alternatively, FTSE Indices Datastream
Sector Index FTSE Financial Indices Datastream
Stock traded Number of traded shares multiplied by their respective World Bank
matching prices
In some specifications of the models we consider aggregated regional proxies for macro and sector measures
according to World Bank geographical classifications. Data for House Prices and Credit to Non-financial
Sector are on a quarterly basis and then annualized. Data from Datastream are daily and then annualized
3.2 Clusters detection
As discussed in Sect. 2.1, a typical benchmark for the cluster analysis of banks’ business
models is the Ward (1963)’s algorithm combined with the Pseudo-F Index (Calin´ski and
Harabasz 1974) as the stopping rule applied to provide the number of clusters. The Pseudo-
F Index is the ratio of between-cluster variance to within-cluster variance and is used as
a metric to assess the quality of the clustering results and to discriminate among different
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specifications of the algorithm setup. In particular, the best configuration, and therefore the
resulting number of clusters, is the one associated with the greatest value of the Pseudo-F
Index.12
In this work, we use a wider list of variables than previous studies and for a larger set of
institutions globally distributed. Hence, we prefer to adopt a hierarchical clustering algorithm
(namely, the Louvain method) that, although in line with the Ward algorithm, is designed to
address the multidimensionality issues in a more appropriate and elegant way for complex
and sparse data samples (Lancichinetti et al. 2011; Chakraborty et al. 2013).
In our study, the Louvain classification method relies on the similarities among institu-
tions’ financial statement attributes, collected in a vector per bank and per year. To determine
these similarities we compute a standard measure used in information retrieval (van Dongen
and Enright 2012), namely the cosine similarity, which is typically applied for sparse and
multidimensional data (Tan et al. 2006). Hence, we calculate the cosine of the angle between
each pair of vectors in the inner product space and we divide it by the vectors’ L2 norms
to make it bounded between −1 and +1. Then, the hierarchical Louvain clustering method
(Blondel et al. 2008) is applied to the pair-wise similarity matrix to find groups of institutions
adopting similar business strategies. These groups are identified by maximizing the modu-
larity quantity, which is a measure that quantifies the strength of division of a system into
clusters of densely interconnected institutions that are only sparsely connected with the rest
of the system (Newman and Girvan 2004). In our analysis, the resulting clusters represent
peer groups of banks sharing similar business strategies. Details of the classification approach
are given in Appendix C.
It should be noted that missing values represent a key issue in clustering algorithms
whenever authors aim to accommodate the complete data set. The absence of a certain
balance sheet item is itself a sign of a business feature and some authors (e.g., Ayadi and De
Groen 2015) replace them with zeros. The method proposed in this study does not require
ad-hoc assumptions on missing values as by construction the cosine similarity is computed
on available data only, providing a more suitable and robust classification for complex and
sparse databases like ours.
To test the suitability, or “validation”, of the Louvain method we compare in Sect. 4.1
the quality of these clusters with the direct classification provided by Bankscope and the
clusters obtained from the Ward algorithm, being aware that it is a complex task with no easy
solutions (Han et al. 2011).13
3.3 Empirical approach for risk assessment
The prediction of banks’ distress during the recent financial crisis is performed by means of
a logit model on the cross-sectional distribution of three types of variables prior to the global
12 This means that those balance sheet items that determine the best configuration may change in time.
Therefore, it may be difficult to find a coherent explanation of the emergence of peer groups over time when
these groups arise due to balance sheet dimensions that are volatile in number and nature. In addition, the best
configuration in Ward is usually associated to a quite small number of variables. By contrast, we believe it is
important to consider a richer and detailed list of balance sheet attributes to properly disentangle peer groups.
This, in turn, is a further reason on our use of the Louvain method instead of Ward. See Joseph and Bryson
(1997) for discussion on the importance of clustering partitions.
13 We also employ non-parametric equality of medians tests (i.e., the Kruskal–Wallis test) to verify whether
groups originate from different distributions, along with post-hoc multiple pairwise comparisons (i.e., the
Dunn test) to specifically find differences among pairs of groups. We use the Bonferroni correction to take into
account the Family-Wise Error Rate, as well as other approaches like Sidak and Holm corrections obtaining
similar results. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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financial crisis. Specifically, our empirical model is:
Pr(Yi = 1|xi ) = (xiβ) (1)
where  is a logistic function and Yi assumes value 1 if institution i has been under distressed
conditions in the period from 2008 to 2010 and 0 otherwise. Vector x includes bank-specific
measures, financial sector indicators and macro variables. This investigation setup is in line
with other works in this literature which aim at disentangling the effects of banks features
from the impacts of sectoral and macro controls in the prediction of the likelihood of distress
during the recent financial crisis. Given the broad geographical coverage we devote attention
in including controls able to map banking and financial sectors worldwide (see Appendix D).
The design of our work intends to identify specific banks features that have different impact
to distress due to peer groups membership. Although banks may have changed their business
strategies in the expectation of future distress, we believe that the extent of the crisis of 2008
was not properly embedded in banking practices before the effective outbreak of financial
markets. However, to limit endogeneity issues, we follow similar investigation frameworks
proposed in the literature (see e.g., Manzaneque et al. 2015; Vazquez and Federico 2015) and
we exploit the pre-crisis averages (from 2005 to 2007) to compute values of the explanatory
variables.14
In addition, due to the presence of a few distress events, we decide to apply a rare event
logistic regression to take into account the possibility of a small amount of cases of the rarer
outcome. In our work, this aspect is particularly relevant when risk assessment models are
estimated within peer groups. Hence, to reduce the small-sample bias in the maximum like-
lihood estimation, we apply the Firth’s Penalized-likelihood logistic regression (Firth 1993),
which is a convenient approach to obtain finite and consistent estimates of the regression
parameters when maximum likelihood procedure suffers from complete or quasi-complete
separation. This bias preventive approach imposes priors on model coefficients to limit small
sample bias in the log-likelihood regression log L∗(β) = log L(β) + A(β), where A(β)
stands for the Jeffreys invariant prior 1/2 log [det(I (β))] and I (·) is the Fisher information
matrix. To remove the first-order bias of the ML estimates, Firth’s correction introduces a
term that goes to zero as the sample size increases and counteracts the first-order term from
the asymptotic expansion of the bias of the ML estimation. Ma et al. (2013) find, for instance,
that Firth’s correction is more powerful than score test based meta-analysis and controls type
I error well for both balanced and unbalanced studies.
Our risk of distress models rely on proxies for CAMELS dimensions with a wide coverage
(see also Table 2 for more details). Among the possible balance sheet indicators, we focus
on those that are well-represented over time and across different types of institutions. In
particular, capital adequacy is measured by two ratios: equity to assets ratio (as measure
of leverage) and the sum of equity plus subordinated borrowings over total assets (Capital
Funding Ratio). Capital adequacy represents the level of bank capitalization and higher
values stand for better solvency conditions, thus lower values are expected to increase the
probability of bank distress. The asset quality is assessed through the return on assets (ROA);
in principle, higher returns are negatively related to distressed conditions. The assessment of
asset quality within the CAMELS framework usually includes the relationship between loans
losses and reserves for impaired loans as an indicator of the quality of the assets side. Due to
the relatively poor coverage in our sample for the period prior to the crisis, we rely on RO A
14 Alternatively, other studies focus on the temporal distance to default (Cole and White 2012) as a balance
sheet risk driver used to explain how distress can be affected by the economic cycle (Manzaneque et al. 2015).
Note, however, that our pre-crisis period captures the growth phase of the economic cycle and is, therefore,
consistent with Manzaneque et al. (2015).
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in our main model and then carry out robustness checks for a sub-sample that employs bad
loans over total loans. ROA has embedded in the numerator (net income) the contribution of
loans losses, while the denominator (total assets) reflects the presence of the corresponding
reserves. Appendix F reports our findings for our risk assessment models in which both the
capital adequacy and the asset quality are proxied by more accurate, although less available,
accounting-based dimensions. For capital adequacy we consider, in fact, the Tier 1 and the
Total Capital Ratio, while for asset quality we use Impaired Loans to Gross Loans and
Loan Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans. Notwithstanding the sample coverage decreases
substantially for these models, we anticipate that the main findings on risk assessment are
largely confirmed.
We measure the management quality by means of the return on equity (ROE) and the
ratio of operating expenses over operating income (Cost to Income Ratio). The relationships
between management quality and the probability of distress is expected to be negative, as
better management practices should foster economic performances and institution resilience
to distress. Net Interest Margin is utilized as a proxy for earnings and the expected sign of the
relationship with distress is negative. In addition, the earnings dimension is approximated by
the ratio of Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities and, in this case, the expected relationship
is positive. Liquidity is measured by the ratio of liquid assets over customer and short-term
funding (Liquid Assets to Short-Term Funding) and by the ratio of deposits and short-term
funding over total funding (Deposits to Total Funding). Usually, institutions with better
liquidity conditions are more likely to meet their financial obligations and thus are perceived
as less risky (Tirole 2011). Finally, the sensitivity to market risk is measured by the share of
securities to total assets (Total Securities to Total Assets). The relationship with the probability
of distress is ambiguous since securities are a volatile source of income but at the same time
can be more liquid than, for example, loans. This feature is particularly relevant for risk
assessment during the recent crisis since the effects of fire sales, which represented a channel
through which financial distress spread throughout the system, made some institutions more
vulnerable. Summary statistics of the predictors’ values are shown in Table 3.
Although referring to accounting-based information, CAMELS indicators used in the
models for risk distress are not trivially related to the business strategies detected in Sect. 3.2.
In fact, (i) CAMELS are not among the indicators used in the multi-dimensional clustering
procedure, and (ii) although CAMELS may represent transformation of some indicators
used as inputs for the clustering analysis, they are in general strongly representative of the
reciprocal influence of both balance sheet and income statement variables, where the latter
are excluded from the clustering procedure.
3.3.1 Distress events definitions
As described above, the dependent variable Yi in Eq. (1) is a dichotomous variable that takes
value 1 if institution i has been under distressed conditions in the period from 2008 to 2010
and 0 otherwise. Table 4 shows the distress events definitions and the corresponding sources
that we used to construct this variable.
Institutions may be under distressed conditions due to several reasons, although the recent
financial crisis suggests that government bailouts and state aids had a role in the avoidance of
systemic crisis and cascade of banks’ failures. Therefore, direct failures were quite rare and
presenting estimates separately for different distress events would have made the econometric
estimation not robust enough. For these reasons, we propose a comprehensive list of distress
events which takes into account several definitions of bank distress (for an approach similar
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Table 3 Predictors summary statistics Values are computed as averages over the interval 2005–2007. Source:
Authors’ own elaborations on data from Bankscope, BIS, Datastream, OECD and World Bank
Obs q0.05 q0.25 Median Mean q0.75 q0.95
Capital 7906 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.31
Capital funding ratio 7906 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.31
ROA 7854 − 0.0001 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
Cost to income ratio 8376 0.35 0.56 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.89
ROE 7848 − 0.002 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.26
Net interest margin 7825 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.09
Interest expenses to total liabilities 7769 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07
Liquid assets to short-term funding 7784 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.34 0.40 0.97
Deposits to total funding 7857 0.52 0.84 0.96 0.88 1.00 1.00
Total securities to total assets 8427 0.003 0.07 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.50
GDP per capita 8509 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08
Inflation 8274 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.10
House Price 7322 − 0.02 − 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.25
Unemployment 8464 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10
FDI-Inflows 8476 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.16
FDI-Outflows 8239 0.005 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.17
Central Gvt. Debt 7406 0.11 0.42 0.44 0.58 0.62 1.45
Gvt. long-term yield 7495 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08
Banks NPLs to gross loans 8128 0.004 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06
Credit to non-financial sector 7457 0.29 0.54 0.83 0.79 0.92 1.42
Market index 7769 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.50
Sector index 7466 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.26 1.32
Stock traded 7020 0.04 0.73 0.77 1.24 2.24 2.50
For variables definitions see Sect. 3.1
to ours see Betz et al. (2014) and Vazquez and Federico (2015), while Kick and Koetter
(2007) distinguish between different types of distress).
Bankruptcy occurs if the net worth of the bank falls below a country-specific regula-
tory threshold, while liquidation concerns the sale of bank’s assets by the liquidator as per
the guidelines of the country regulations and the distribution of the corresponding assets
to claimants. These two distress events were quite rare during the recent financial crisis as
governments interventions created a safe net to prevent cascade failures. We therefore intro-
duce additional distress definitions to capture these interventions. Defaults occurs if the bank
failed to repay interests or principal on its financial obligations beyond any grace period or
if some of its instruments are replaced by other obligations at a diminished value as a con-
sequence of a distressed exchange between counterparts. We rely on ratings from Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s to assess the presence of a default state. In particular, we merge
both short-term and long-term ratings and only if the evaluation of the bank conditions is
poor in both cases we consider that bank under a default situation. Moreover, forced mergers
of distressed institutions have occurred during the crisis. We define an institution as part
of a distressed merger if its coverage ratio in t − 1 was negative. Coverage ratio is a typi-
cal indicator used to assess banks’ vulnerability conditions (see e.g., González-Hermosillo
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1999) and is computed as the sum of equity plus reserves for non-performing loans minus
total impaired loans over total assets.15 In addition, we consider as distressed mergers also
those cases where the institutions present a rating indicating a vulnerable state. Finally, we
enrich the data set of distressed institutions by including the information of public bailouts
(Laeven and Valencia 2010, 2012) and, for the US perimeter, we integrate Bankscope with
bankruptcy information from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.16
The largest proportion of distress events (42%) occurred by the end of 2008, declining
considerably by the end of 2009 (33%) and 2010 (25%). However, discriminating distress
events by year within the crisis period of 2008–2010 can be misleading as reported, for
instance, by Laeven and Valencia (2012).17
4 Banks’ business strategies identification and distress events
4.1 Clusters validation
We rely on three main measures for clustering validation, namely the average silhouette
width, the Pearson gamma and the average within/between ratio of the distances (see e.g.,
Halkidi et al. 2001; Han et al. 2011). Note that to clusterize the whole data set of institu-
tions, assumptions aimed at filling missing values, which are of a substantial proportion on
a sample size and geographic coverage of this magnitude, have to be considered. Table 5
provides performance measures of each of the three clustering methodologies under four
main assumptions for filling missing values: [Z] that assigns zeros to all missing values; [A]
that replaces each missing value with the average value across the whole sample for that
variable; [M] similar to the average case but using the medians; [EM] that estimates missing
values using a bootstrap procedure for multiple imputations which combines the Expected
Maximization algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977) used to find the mode of the posterior dis-
tribution with a bootstrap approach to take draws from this posterior (Honaker and King
2010). Clustering validation measures are computed for the indirect methods and the direct
classification (i.e., Bankscope institutions’ specializations) using the resulting clusters from
the respective approaches and, to enhance comparability, filling missing values using these
four criteria separately.
Results confirm that the direct classification is a poor indicator of business strategy assess-
ment, whereas the indirect approaches (both the Louvain adopted in this study and the Ward
algorithm) provide superior clustering estimates across different model configurations and
validation measures.
Specifically, our evidence indicates that institutions with the same direct specialization
may adopt quite different business strategies. Therefore, in line with our expectations, we
infer that the direct classification does not provide a sufficiently informative indication of
banks’ activities, particularly when considering cross-country comparisons. Both Louvain
and Ward scores are much higher for the first two statistics and lower for the wb ratio than
the direct one by far, supporting the adoption of indirect classifications as better methods to
identify banking peer groups. Between the two indirect methods, we observe a very close and
15 For the impact of all mergers, not just distressed ones, to distress see Vazquez and Federico (2015).
16 For a study focused on US only, see the ranking-based methods of financial distress proposed by DeYoung
and Torna (2013) to reveal the identity of those US troubled institutions reported by FDIC.
17 Due to the complexity of government aids and the timing of their implementation, we follow Laeven and
Valencia (2012) definition of the crisis period for consistency.
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consistent performance across the different model configurations and validation measures.
However, we favour the Louvain over the Ward method given the characteristics of our sample
and for its advantages when dealing with sparse and complex data.
4.2 Identification of banks’business strategies
The aggregate factors used to identify banking business strategies resulting from the cluster
analysis are reported in Table 6. Each column represents a business model, where the three
dominant or “core” groups that account for the largest number of institutions are labelled as:
A, B and C. Groups A and C correspond to the two polar cases of wholesale-oriented/modern
banks and deposit-oriented/traditional banks, respectively, while group B is a hybrid case
in between A and C.18 Institutions within these peer groups span well across countries and
continents, supporting our empirical setup on a global coverage (details in Appendix D).
In some cases, institutions have migrated from one group to the other over the period as
discussed in Appendix E.
Group A is is the most popular group in terms of number of institutions (over 3500) and
is characterized by the largest proportion of wholesale funding, accounting for roughly 34%
of total assets on average, and well diversified loan investments with moderate exposures to
interbank activities. Close similarities are found with the “Wholesale-funded” model discov-
ered in Roengpitya et al. (2014) and the “Wholesale” peer group presented in Ayadi et al.
(2012).19 Typical institutions in this group have size above average, comparatively low lever-
age and medium levels of net liquidity. Many US bank holding companiess (e.g., Citigroup)
and the top investment banks (e.g., Goldman Sachs), and Russian commercial banks are
classified in this group, followed by French (e.g., Société Générale) and Swiss commercial
banks (e.g., Credit Swisse).
Group B is characterized by a moderate amount of wholesale funding and the largest
exposure to commercial loans investments, which differentiate it from the well diversified
group A. Institutions in this group tend to be smaller than those in group A; they also tend
to be highly leveraged and with an appropriate maturity transformation. Their features are
similar to the risky “Stakeholder” banks reported in DeYoung and Torna (2013). Group B
represents a hybrid peer group similar to group A on the liability side and more traditional
on the asset side (similar to group C). Most of the institutions classified in this model are
German (Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank cooperative banks and Sparkasse savings banks)
and US-based (mainly regional and state commercial banks). Italy is well represented too in
this business model in 2007, with a relatively large number of cooperative along with some
commercial and saving banks migrated from the model D discussed below.
18 These groups are also consistent in the post-crisis period as reported in Appendix E. To provide a represen-
tation of the main features for each peer group, we rely on aggregate variables due to the presence of missing
values among the measures used to compute the cosine similarities (Appendix A). When cross checking those
variables statistics across different time periods, groups’ characteristics appear very stable over time. Since
there is inter-temporal stability of institutions within the same cluster (see Table 11 and Appendix E), this
evidence confirms our findings of stable membership, thus supporting the interpretation of their features in
terms of peer groups.
19 Roengpitya et al. (2014)’s “Wholesale-funded” business model is derived from a much smaller global
sample compared to ours. It is characterized by 65.2% of gross loans and 36.7% of wholesale debt, along with
a 63.1% stable funding, which are in a similar range as our group A. Their interbank composition is slightly
less prominent than the one we find for our group A. Ayadi et al. (2012)’s “Wholesale” group is identified
using a set of large European banks and is characterized by interbank borrowings and lending (23.2% and
16.6% respectively) very similar to ours. Their Wholesale model tends to be more exposed to non-interest
income investments and non-deposit funding compared to ours.
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Institutions belonging to the third core peer group C engage primarily on traditional cus-
tomer deposits funding (the largest across models) and lending activities (mainly commercial
loans). They are also the only interbank net lenders among the three core business strategies.
In theory, group C provides the most stable funded business strategy due to the deposit-driven
liabilities. Roengpitya et al. (2014) find a retail-funded model closely related to our group
C.20 High leverage, along with dominant commercial loan investments, makes this model
very similar to the peer group B, although featuring a much more stable funding due to the
large proportion of customer deposits to total funding. This is also the business strategy that
provides the most dominant maturity transformation of all (the lowest net liquidity value),
confirming the provision of traditional banking services. This feature supports the empirical
evidence reported in Paligorova and Santos (2016) on the maturity transformation charac-
teristics of wholesale versus deposit-oriented banks. This model is primarily represented by
Japanese cooperative banks and US commercial and savings institutions (e.g., Washington
Mutual).
Our classification approach also captures two other specialised groups that were prevalent
in the first 2 years of our sample and then disappeared at the onset of the crisis. The first,
labelled group D, accounts for about 1500 institutions, and is characterized by dominant long-
term funding, commercial investments and a net interbank lending exposure (as in group C).
Italian and Spanish co-operative and savings banks are the most represented institutions.
Most of these institutions migrated to the B peer group in 2007 due to the close similarity
with regards to their assets side, with few exceptions migrating to group C (see Appendix E).
The second of these specialised business strategies, labelled group E, was characterised by
a diversified funding combined with the largest exposure to retail loans investments. Those
institutions were also highly leveraged compared with the other peer groups. This model was
dominated by Swiss saving banks and US bank holdings. At the onset of the crisis most of
them migrated to group A.
4.3 Distress events by business strategy
Table 7 illustrates the distribution of 2008–2010 distress events by peer groups.21 Most
distress events are found in group A, suggesting a fragile business strategy as also reported,
for instance, in Ayadi et al. (2011), Demyanyk and Hasan (2010) and Roengpitya et al.
(2014). However, generally distress events appear sufficiently well-spread across business
strategies.22
Our findings offer evidence of a size effect for the wholesale-oriented peer groups as
distressed institutions are significantly larger in terms of total assets than their peers. For
group A, the 64 banks under distress accounted for $10.5tn of total group assets in 2007, 1/6
of the total of their peers, and average sizes of more than $160bn, almost six times bigger
than their peers. Similarly, the 28 distressed institutions in group B reached a total assets
20 Ayadi et al. (2011) find a deposit-oriented group to be net-borrower in the interbank market as opposed
to our group C; we find this result holds after the crisis. However, their analysis is restricted to European
institutions only. In line with our findings for the peer group C, Roengpitya et al. (2014)’s retail-funded model
is the largest deposit driven model (66.7% of total assets), characterised by very high stable funding and quite
diversified assets side.
21 The total number of institutions considered in the model for risk assessment is 8526. Institutions that have
been always in the same peer group in the interval 2005–2007 are: 2355 (Group A), 2053 (B) and 1460 (C).
22 The remaining 62 distress events are associated with institutions switching peer groups, for example 14
institutions in group D in 2005–2006 moving to group B in 2007; or similarly 11 institutions in group E
migrating to group A and so on, with some mixed results in terms of relative sizes.
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Table 7 Distribution of distress events for business strategy membership Column names refer to business
strategy peer groups in year 2007; row names in bold stand for peer groups in year 2006; finally, row names
in italics refer to peer groups in 2005. Source: Authors’ own elaborations
↓ 2006\2007 → A B C Total (2006)
Sub-total (2005)
A (2005 ↓) 67 6 2 75
A 64 4 2 70
B 1 1 0 2
C 1 0 0 1
D 1 0 0 1
E 0 1 0 1
B (2005 ↓) 4 31 0 35
A 1 1 0 2
B 3 28 0 31
C 0 0 0 0
D 0 2 0 2
E 0 0 0 0
C (2005 ↓) 1 0 51 52
A 0 0 1 1
B 0 0 0 0
C 1 0 50 51
D 0 0 0 0
E 0 0 0 0
D (2005 ↓) 9 17 4 30
A 2 3 0 5
B 0 0 0 0
C 1 0 0 1
D 6 14 4 24
E 0 0 0 0
E (2005 ↓) 11 1 0 12
A 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 0
E 11 1 0 12
Total (2007) 92 55 57 204
Each cell represents the number of distressed institutions referring to the corresponding combination of peer
groups membership. Row Total (2007) shows the number of distressed institutions partitioned according to the
three peer groups in 2007; similarly, column Total (2006) stands for the total number of distressed institutions
based on classification in 2006. By Sub-Total (2005) we indicate the number of distressed institutions for peer
groups in 2005 within partitions of 2006
coverage of $2tn in 2007, 1/5 of the whole amount of the group with average sizes up to 15
times those of their peer group members.
In contrast, for group C the average size of distressed institutions during the period 2008–
2010 is in line with their peers, with not consistent patterns to be spotted at the country level
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either. For the 50 distress institutions found for group C in 2005–2007, total assets were “just”
$600bn compared to the $24.5tn of the whole group in 2007, with average sizes even below
the average of their peers ($12.2bn for the distressed institutions compared with the group
average of $16.8bn in 2007). This would suggest that relative size on a business strategy
with very high stable funding does not matter for purposes of risk assessment. This effect is
empirically tested in Sect. 5.
5 Empirical results on the determinants of banks’ distress
5.1 Baselinemodel results (all banks)
Table 8 reports the results from our baseline models to assess the likelihood of distress during
the global financial crisis. The first three specifications regress our dependent variable, i.e.
banks’ distress events, on each group of predictors separately, i.e. the proxies for CAMELS,
the macro and the sectoral dimensions.23 The last two columns provide, respectively, the
results for: the model that includes all variables and selected variables only. Focusing on the
first set of results (column CAMELS) our evidence reveals that in most cases relationships
with banks’ distress are as expected, with negative and significant effects with the variables
Capital,24 Cost to Income Ratio, Net Interest margins and our two Liquidity proxies; and
positive and significant associations with ROE and Total Securities to Total Assets.
The impact of bank capital is mixed, as more equity over assets seems to be associated
with lower risk-taking, as found in similar models proposed by, e.g., Betz et al. (2014) and
Vazquez and Federico (2015). However, when considered together with subordinated debts in
order to mimic the regulatory capital (the Capital Funding Ratio variable), the sign is positive,
although the level of significance is low. There are various possible reasons for this mixed
result, including potential moral hazard effects at play at high regulatory capital levels. A
caveat of this interpretation might be based on the presence of either non-linear or thresholds
effects (Estrella et al. 2000); the model may also suffer from some multicollinearity issue
which motivates a more parsimonious model that will be described below.
ROE is a measure of profitability that may be due to higher risk taking, for example if the
denominator is low, so riskier activities seem to have implied higher probability of distress.
We anticipate that ROE could ultimately have a negative impact on distress depending on
the banks’ strategies, a result which would support our intuition on the main hypotheses to
discriminate risk drivers among peer groups (see Sect. 5.2).
Large liquid positions influenced negatively the risk of distress, as higher levels of liquidity
can strengthen the solvency of the institution (see e.g., Khan et al. 2016). Banks usually follow
assets and liabilities management (i.e., ALM) procedures to gauge liquidity, interest rates and
currency mismatches of their exposures and to assess the buoyancy of funding and liquidity
sources (DeYoung and Jang 2016). Failure to properly manage these sensitivities before the
outbreak of financial markets could have undermined the quality of balance sheets and made
banks more prone to distress.
The share of securities to total assets (Total security to Total Assets) resembles the sen-
sitivity to market risk. The relationship with the probability of distress can be ambiguous
23 As reported by Cole and White (2012), DeYoung and Torna (2013) and Jin et al. (2011), among others,
balance sheet indicators have been successfully included in the assessment of banks’ probability of distress
together with macro and sectoral controls to improve predictive information.
24 For a deep review on the topic see Shleifer and Vishny (2011).
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Table 8 Distress assessment The first three models refer to specifications within the corresponding group of
predictors: CAMELS, Macro and Sector, respectively
Camels Macro Sector All Selected
Intercept − 0.740 − 2.661∗∗∗ − 2.462 4.005 − 0.632
(0.459) (0.331) (1.710) (4.420) (0.473)
C Capital − 0.048∗∗ 0.024 − 0.010
(0.023) (0.021) (0.013)
C Capital funding ratio 0.036∗ − 0.038∗∗
(0.019) (0.017)
AROA − 0.017 − 0.306∗∗∗ − 0.217∗∗
(0.074) (0.110) (0.098)
M Cost to income ratio − 0.015∗∗∗ − 0.009∗
(0.005) (0.006)
M ROE 0.023∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.010)
E Net interest margin − 0.047∗ 0.020∗∗ − 0.070
(0.026) (0.009) (0.052)
E Interest expenses to 0.026 0.086∗∗∗
Total liabilities (0.017) (0.031)
L Liquid assets to short − 0.004∗∗ − 0.001
Term funding (0.002) (0.002)
L Deposits to Total − 0.026∗∗∗ − 0.022∗∗∗ − 0.022∗∗∗
Funding (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
STotal securities to 0.010∗∗ 0.006 0.004
Total assets (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP per capita − 1.062∗∗∗ − 0.223 − 0.605∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.579) (0.215)
Inflation 0.560∗∗∗ 0.170 0.415∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.362) (0.080)
House price 0.085∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.069)
Unemployment − 0.144∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.078∗
(0.049) (0.151) (0.041)
FDI-inflows − 0.017 0.142
(0.028) (0.142)
FDI-outflows 0.088∗∗∗ − 0.058
(0.026) (0.187)
Central Gvt. debt − 0.010∗ − 0.015
(0.006) (0.024)
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Table 8 continued
Camels Macro Sector All Selected
Gvt. Long-term yield 0.399∗∗ − 0.795
(0.166) (0.796)
Banks NPLs to − 0.201∗∗ − 0.332∗∗∗ − 0.400∗∗∗
Gross loans (0.091) (0.125) (0.080)
Credit to Non-fin 0.003 − 0.018∗
Sector (0.008) (0.010)
Market index − 0.129∗∗∗ − 0.133 − 0.073∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.102) (0.019)
Sector index 0.023 − 0.032 0.026∗∗
(0.018) (0.091) (0.012)
Stock traded − 0.004∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Num. obs. 7515 7251 6243 5292 6584
Num. distress events 170 179 153 120 137
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.042 0.083 0.069 0.242 0.119
McFadden’s Adj. Pseudo R2 0.027 0.073 0.056 0.188 0.097
Column All stands for the model with the entire set of predictors. Column Selected represents a parsimonious
model where we include about half of the predictors according mainly to data availability and significance of
the coefficients in the single specifications of the model. For variables definitions see Sect. 3. Superscripts C,
A, M, E, L, S indicate the respective CAMELS dimensions
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
since securities represent a volatile source of income, although at the same time these assets
can be more liquid than, for example, loans. This aspect was particularly relevant during
the recent crisis since the effects of fire-sales made some institutions more vulnerable. Our
baseline models point to a marginal and positive effect, although not always statistically
significant.
We stress here the importance of macro and sectoral indicators in the prediction of banks’
distress. Higher GDP per capita reduced the likelihood of being in distress, so better economic
conditions seem to have fostered financial system resilience, whereas higher Inflation and
FDI Outflows increased the likelihood of institution’s distress (Ostry et al. 2012). We note that
the variable House Price had a positive and significant sign which probably outlines the role
of the mortgage market whose collapse during the recent crisis heavily influenced financial
stability (Cole and White 2012). Odd sign of Unemployment in the Macro model disappears
once we introduce a more comprehensive list of predictors. Expected results arise when
considering the sectoral analysis, with Market Index returns working in the same direction as
GDP per capita, coherently with the high level of correlation among these variables as reported
in Table 10 of Appendix B. Marginal negative effects appear for the Central Government
Debt and even for the proportion of domestic financial sector NPLs to total loans (Banks
NPLs to Gross Loan). Opposite contribution to institutions’ resilience was associated with
sovereign debt yields (Gvt. Long-Term Yield) whose dynamics usually reflects the country
risk appetite by investors. The presence of sovereign instruments in banks’ balance sheets
often relates to regulatory requirements and the need to fulfill capital constraints based on
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the amount of risk-weighted assets.25 Financial institutions are, in fact, usually exposed to
sovereign debt instruments, especially domestic issuances, which influence banking practices
and impact on the likelihood of being vulnerable to distress from shocks arising in the
sovereign debt markets (see e.g., Laeven and Valencia 2012). Macro-economic and sectoral
conditions thus play a role in predicting the likelihood of banks’ distress, supporting the
inclusion of macro-prudential policies as complement to micro-prudential and bank level
tools.
For completeness, we also run a specification with all predictors, even though we note that
the large number of variables compared with the amount of observations and distress events
does not allow for an accurate and proper econometric investigation. The fifth specification
aims at circumscribing this issue by implementing a parsimonious model using half of the
predictors. The selection of these variables is driven mainly by their coverage within the
sample and the significance of the estimates within the single models, but still preserving the
representation of all CAMELS dimensions as well as macro and sectoral control variables.
Among the individual predictors in this enriched framework we notice that higher levels
for both ROA and Deposits to Total Funding facilitated the resilience of the institutions; an
opposite contribution emerges for ROE suggesting that increasing propensity to risk taking
prior to the crisis predicted institutions to be in distress. At the macro level, we confirm
the impact of the country business cycle approximated by the GDP per capita, while high
Inflation and Unemployment levels deteriorated banks’ stability conditions. At the sectoral
level, Market Index has the same negative sign as GDP per capita as presented above. The
sectoral market index (Sector Index, i.e. market returns of the financial sector), however,
was positively and significantly related to distress, capturing the effect of the financial sector
bubble prior to the crisis. It is worth noting that the pseudo R2 of the single model regressions
are low, while we reach higher values of explained variability in bank probability of distress
with the inclusion of a more comprehensive list of predictors (see model Selected). Due to
the level of correlations of ROA, ROE and Capital reported in Table 10, Appendix F validates
our estimations by providing more in-depth variants of the Selected model. Specifically, we
estimate the model by retaining only one of the aforementioned regressors. We also include
interaction effects to capture potential effects beyond a simple linear relationship. Results
are reported in Table 15.
5.2 Risk drivers by banks’peer groups
The information about banks’ business strategies represents a valuable opportunity for regu-
lators to investigate institutions’ characteristics and vulnerability to distress during the crisis.
This would support targeted intervention and more accurate risk monitoring. In this Section
we analyze each peer group separately by partitioning the sample according to their ‘stable’
membership over the interval 2005–2007. This setup allows us to disentangle the impact of
being in a particular peer group in the pursuit of testing our main hypothesis. Hence, Table 9
focuses on a restricted case where we discard institutions that switched peer groups prior to
the crisis and, therefore, are less representative for those business strategies. Since the num-
ber of observations and, in particular, distress events under each peer group is modest, we
need to consider a Penalized-likelihood logistic regression with very few predictors. For this
analysis we focus on the two core and polar groups A (modern banking) and C (traditional
25 For instance prior to the crisis banks under Basel regulations usually benefit from lower risk-weights for
positions on government bonds instead of loans. For details see e.g., BCBS (2013).
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model).26 We propose a simple framework with common CAMELS variables and two basic
macro predictors (GDP per capita and Inflation) along with two sectoral variables which
capture market dynamics (Government LT Yield and Market Index return). Estimates (both
the signs and the magnitudes) for the entire set of no-switching institutions (All model) are
similar to those discussed in the Selected model of Table 8, providing reassurance against
potential endogeneity problems. This also supports the selection of these predictors for the
reference model used to create specifications for each peer group. Note that although confined
to specific peer groups membership, these configurations share the same setup of previous
models to enhance comparability. In addition, we add the level of institutions’ total assets
as predictor. As discussed in Sect. 4.3, size relative to their peers seems to matter for the
event of distress during the recent financial crisis at least for the wholesale-oriented institu-
tions.
Table 9 confirms that dominant assets size relative to their peer group members exac-
erbated the likelihood of distress only on group A, i.e. the most wholesale-oriented
model, whereas it had no significant impact for the deposit-oriented group. This find-
ing provides an alternative view on the “too-big-to-fail” problem that can be tailored
to specific peer groups. Estimates indicate that groups A and C present quite differ-
ent risk drivers in terms of CAMELS variables during the global financial crisis: ROE
impacted positively on the likelihood of distress for group A institutions and negatively
for C ones (although the coefficient magnitude is relatively small), while ROA exhib-
ited an opposite pattern and Capital had a negative sign for group C institutions but
did not show significant effects for those in group A. The only exception is on the
proxy for liquidity that was negative and consistent across model specifications. This
result provides supporting evidence on the debates that stress the impact of liquidity to
the recent financial crisis (Tirole 2011) as independent of the adopted business strat-
egy.
On the impact of Capital (and reciprocally on leverage), we recall that group C institutions
were on average less capitalized (highly leveraged) compared to those in group A, and would
have definitely benefited from a boost of capital to enhance stability (Berger and Bouwman
2013; Vazquez and Federico 2015). However, we would take a step further into the assessment
of leverage via ROA and ROE. Advancing on the explanation on the effect of ROA, we
compare the level of diversification on the assets side between traditional deposit-oriented and
modern wholesale-oriented groups, more precisely the differences between a loan-focused
versus a well diversified investment strategy. Institutions within the highly leveraged business
strategy as those in group C could not fully exploit a wide spectrum of investment choices
to boost their returns on assets (see Chiorazzo et al. 2008 for evidence in the EU). This was
due to a limited range of instruments in their assets side (recall their investment strategy
mainly focused on commercial/corporate loans), which probably impacted on their ability
to select risk-adjusted profitable investments compared with group A institutions. Empirical
evidence shows that deposit funded banks tended to extend more credit lines to firms on
longer maturities (Paligorova and Santos 2016) due to their stable funding (Ivashina and
Scharfstein 2010; Kashyap et al. 2002), which although promoting profitability would have
exposed them to the corporate credit market that was affected by the sub-prime mortgage
crisis.
26 We omit model specifications for groups B, D and E only due to the limitation of distress events. In
Appendix F we report an alternative specification of the regression models presented in Table 9 where we
use proxies to fill missing values, thus enlarging the sample size. Results still show very similar effects. To
enhance comparability, the robustness checks in Appendix F also consider the other peer groups omitted in
Table 9.
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Table 9 Distress assessment within business strategies Columns Group A and Group C refer to observations
for institutions that do not change peer group and that belong to that specific business strategy indicated in the
name of the column
All Group A Group C WS oriented WS oriented (restricted)
Intercept − 2.282∗∗∗ − 1.130 4.942∗∗∗ − 2.564∗∗∗ − 1.815∗∗
(0.537) (1.108) (1.764) (0.628) (0.925)
C Capital − 0.005 0.010 − 0.138∗∗ 0.006 0.018
(0.015) (0.013) (0.055) (0.013) (0.012)
AROA − 0.092 − 0.175∗ 0.678∗∗ − 0.240∗∗ − 0.252∗∗
(0.103) (0.094) (0.286) (0.104) (0.105)
M ROE 0.025∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ − 0.042∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015)
E Net interest margin − 0.075∗ 0.012 0.169 − 0.082∗∗ − 0.025
(0.040) (0.009) (0.166) (0.036) (0.049)
L Deposits to total funding − 0.018∗∗∗ − 0.020∗∗∗ − 0.066∗∗∗ − 0.017∗∗∗ − 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006)
STotal securities to total assets − 0.007 0.004 − 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
GDP per capita 0.012 − 0.144 − 3.061∗∗∗ 0.082 − 0.043
(0.107) (0.206) (1.048) (0.100) (0.171)
Inflation 0.196 0.203 − 0.150 0.141 0.319
(0.130) (0.220) (0.486) (0.135) (0.196)
Gvt. Long-term yield 0.248∗ − 0.275 0.852∗ 0.050 − 0.242
(0.136) (0.287) (0.483) (0.170) (0.249)
Market index − 0.085∗∗∗ − 0.021 0.088 − 0.050∗∗∗ − 0.057∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.022) (0.062) (0.013) (0.017)
Total assets 2.052∗∗∗ 1.606∗∗∗ 0.029 1.984∗∗∗ 1.531∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.476) (1.450) (0.317) (0.395)
Num. obs. 5780 1867 1231 4870 3450
Num. distress events 126 46 46 92 59
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.115 0.137 0.180 0.107 0.093
McFadden’s Adj. Pseudo R2 0.093 0.067 0.111 0.077 0.048
Column WS-oriented refers in particular to institutions belonging to groups A, B, D and E , admitting for
transitions across these groups and never being in group C in the period 2005–2007 (in the case of groups
D and E the interval that is considered is 2005–2006). Column WS-oriented (Restricted) is circumscribed to
groups A and B. Column All includes all institutions. For regressors definitions see Sect. 3. Superscripts C,
A, M, E, L, S indicate the respective CAMELS dimensions. Total Assets are in USD Trillion
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
On ROE, the opposite effect would be related to the structure of the liabilities side of
the institutions. Group A was already characterized by high exposure to profitable and risky
assets, and further investment decisions aimed to improve the level of ROE could have
worsen the sustainability of their activities (Stiroh 2004) compared with those in group
C. This effect is in line with the findings of Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) on the
nonlinear effect of the growth of non-deposit funding and non-interest income investments
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to the prediction of distress. Group A institutions had higher exposures to interbank debts, and
further investments were indeed likely to involve an increase of this type of leverage, which
in turn deteriorated the resilience of this peer group and, eventually, exacerbated their risk
of distress during the crisis (Vazquez and Federico 2015); Group C institutions on the other
end were characterized by more stable funding, namely deposits, so the mix of funding that
they used for investment purposes was less prone to suffer from financial market instability
(Beltratti and Stultz 2012). The latter phenomenon can imply contagion dynamics that are
related to interbank exposures through which contagion may actually propagate (Krause
and Giansante 2012; Cont and Minca 2016). It is worth recalling that the dependence on
interbank positions was a specific feature of the wholesale-oriented peer groups, while during
the recent crisis customer deposits, dominant funding source in deposit-oriented institutions,
were not particularly affected by bank runs triggered by the lack of confidence in banks’
quality (for discussions see e.g., Gorton 2010). Furthermore, the interconnectivity arisen
from interbank exposures might have determined the need to redefine the bilateral positions
during the outbreak of financial markets to compensate for the increasing perception of
counterpart risk, thus resulting in more volatile balance sheet compositions. This might
have also influenced the reallocation of investments on the assets side, due to constraints on
funding sources which reciprocally affected fire-sales dynamics (Anand et al. 2013; Georg
2013).
Finally, we add a specification which includes all the wholesale-oriented institutions
in the same group (last column is circumscribed to the merge between A and B groups
only). Although the main discussion above compares the two extreme peer groups, namely
A and C, which is in line with the current debates on business models (see Sect. 2), this
further analysis helps validating comparisons between wholesale-oriented models and the
deposit-oriented model, due to the inclusion in particular of group B institutions. All three
specifications of wholesale models proposed are consistent and estimates reinforce the
interpretation that modern wholesale-oriented and traditional deposit-oriented institutions
presented different predictive drivers for the likelihood of distress during the recent financial
crisis. Thus, our results support our main hypothesis by emphasizing different predictive
features of institutions’ probability of distress under traditional or modern banking mod-
els.
6 Conclusions
This study investigates the impact of financial institutions business strategies to the pre-
diction of distress during the 2008 financial crisis. Although empirical evidence suggests
that wholesale-funded institutions are more prone to distress due to low levels of sta-
ble funding, the recent financial crisis exposed the fragility of all business strategies. We
therefore focus our analysis on exploiting banks adopting similar business strategies (peer
groups) to estimate the likelihood of distress during the recent financial crisis in order
to promote banks classifications as a useful assessment procedure for targeted monitor-
ing.
By partitioning the sample according to peer group memberships that were consis-
tent over the period 2005–2007, we confirm that size (in terms of total assets), and
therefore the issue of “too-big-to-fail”, had a significant predictive impact only among
modern wholesale-oriented models. This is not the case within the traditional deposit-
oriented groups, where size did not play any significant role. We also compare modern
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wholesale-oriented versus traditional deposit-oriented institutions noting opposite patterns
for CAMELS risk drivers contributions in predicting the risk of distress: (i) a significant
and negative sign for capital (positive for leverage) only for the less capitalized (highly
leveraged) deposit-oriented group, thus supporting the idea that recapitalization might not
improve resilience for those institutions adopting modern and universal banking practices
that already presented heavy capital burden on their risky exposures; (ii) a negative impact
of ROE for traditional (not well diversified) business models and positive for modern bank-
ing models which captured the impact of leverage based on a stable versus an unstable
funding structure; (iii) opposite effects for ROA that reflected the impact of the pursuit
of higher assets returns on restricted investment portfolios compared to well diversified
ones.
This analysis is expected to provide useful recommendations to regulators, particularly in
the context of the identification of early warning signals and the prediction of bank distress.
For example, the recent Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) put in place
in Europe directly states peer group analysis as an important pillar for the sustainability of
banking sector. By enriching the mainstream banks’ peer group classification, we provide
evidence of how each model presents peculiar predictive drivers for the likelihood of distress
at a global level, where the one-rule-fits-all approach for monitoring and risk assessment
could be dramatically misleading compared to a targeted intervention. The exception we find
is on the impact of liquidity that appeared exogenous to business strategy, supporting the new
adopted Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio introduced by Basel III that
are meant to tackle this issue (BCBS 2011).
The case study offered by the recent crisis identifies peculiar financial statement items as
drivers for the prediction of banking distress. These variables emerge as distinctive features
of their business strategies. In line with our findings, future research could address the reasons
behind peer groups instability and the role of liquidity that we show to be quite consistent
across business strategies. Funding liquidity risk might be deeper analyzed by exploiting
the sensitivity of peer groups to liquidity composition and non-performing loans exposures,
including earlier years and quarterly releases to improve the estimation procedure. This
would require a more parsimonious set of institutions’ features to overcome comparability
issues. The vulnerability of banks could also be assessed by other indicators well-adopted in
literature, such us the distance to default (z-score), SRISK and MES (Acharya et al. 2012,
2017; Brownlees and Engle 2016), COVAR (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011), or DIP
(Huang et al. 2009), which can be easily included in our framework, as well as more focused
macro and sector indicators designed for specific distress events within the geographical
versus peer group space.
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Appendix
A Description of the aggregatedmeasures
In the study of peer groups features we employ a set of aggregated measures which synthesise
balance sheet items. The selection of these measures helps the interpretation of peer groups in
terms of their business strategies because provides a less granular representation of balance
sheet dimensions which, otherwise, would have make the multiple pairwise comparisons
very complex. In addition, this choice partially overcomes the issues related to the presence
of missing values within the set of variables used to compute the cosine similarities. The
following measures are chosen among those usually applied in literature to detect banks’
peer groups. These aggregates are computed on standardized balance sheet variables, i.e.
the constituents of each aggregated dimension are standardized by the total assets of the
respective institution.
• Retail Loans = Residential Mortgage Loans + Other Mortgage Loans + Other Con-
sumer/Retail Loans
• Corporate and Other Loans = Corporate and Commercial Loans + Other Loans
• Retail and Corporate Loans = Residential Mortgage Loans + Other Mortgage Loans +
Other Consumer/Retail Loans + Corporate and Commercial Loans + Other Loans
• Total Loans = Residential Mortgage Loans + Other Mortgage Loans + Other Con-
sumer/Retail Loans + Corporate and Commercial Loans + Other Loans + Loans and
Advances to Banks
• Interbank Lending = Loans and Advances to Banks + Reverse Repos and Cash Collateral
• Investments = At Equity Investments in Associates + Available for Sale Securities +
Trading Securities and At FV Through Income + Held to Maturity Securities + Other
Securities
• Customer Deposits = Customer Deposits (Current, Savings, Term)
• Interbank Borrowing = Deposits from Banks + Other Deposits and Short-Term Borrow-
ings + Repos and Cash Collateral
• Long-Term Funding = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordinated Borrowing +
Other Funding
• Long-Term Funding + Equity = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordinated
Borrowing + Other Funding + Total Equity
• Wholesale Debt = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordinated Borrowing + Other
Funding + Other Deposits and Short-Term Borrowings + Deposits from Banks
• Stable Funding = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordinated Borrowing + Other
Funding + Other Liabilities + Customer Deposits (Current, Savings, Term)
• Stable Funding − CORE = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordinated Borrowing
+ Customer Deposits (Current, Savings, Term)
• Net Liquidity = Cash and Due From Banks + Reverse Repos and Cash Collateral −
Deposits from Banks − Other Deposits and Short-Term Borrowings − Repos and Cash
Collateral − Customer Deposits (Current, Savings, Term)
B Correlationmatrix
See Table 10.
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C Classificationmethod
Given two vectors x and y, their cosine similarity27 is computed as follows:
CosSim(x, y) =
∑
i xi yi√∑
i x
2
i
√∑
i y
2
i
= <x, y>||x ||||y|| (C1)
Once we have measured the pair-wise similarities among institutions we apply a hierarchical
clustering algorithm which identifies groups by maximizing the modularity quantity. This
approach is common in complex system literature where the system resembles a graph or
network of nodes (i.e., the financial institutions in our case) connected by means of edges
(which link pairs of nodes/institutions and are weighted according to the similarities among
them). Modularity measures the strength of division of a system into clusters or communities,
where these groups of densely interconnected nodes are only sparsely connected with the
rest of the system (Newman and Girvan 2004). The modularity is computed as:
Q = 1
2m
∑
i, j
[
Ai j − ki k j2m
]
δ(ci , c j ) (C2)
where Ai j indicates the weight of the edge between nodes i and j (i.e., the similarity among
this pair of institutions), ki = ∑ j Ai j represents the sum of the weights of the edges connected
to node i (basically it measures the similarity of institution i to the rest of the system), ci is
the cluster to which node i belongs (i.e., the peer group), δ(u, v) is equal to 1 if u = v and 0
otherwise, and m = 12
∑
i, j Ai j . Among the approaches proposed in literature to optimise this
quantity (hence, to provide a better partition of the system in clusters), we apply the Louvain
method (Blondel et al. 2008) that has received an increasing interest in complex systems
literature. This algorithm is structured in two phases.28 Firstly, each institution is assigned to
a single cluster (namely, peer group), so there are as many clusters as there are institutions.
Hence, for each institution the algorithm considers its neighbourhood and evaluates the gain
of modularity that can be obtained by joining a different cluster. The combination of nodes
assigned to clusters that gives the maximum gain (if positive) is therefore performed. Then,
the same process is repeated for all institutions until no further improvements in modularity
are achieved. The gain in modularity (i.e., Q) by moving an isolated institution i into a
cluster c can be measured as follows:
Q =
[∑
in +ki,in
2m
−
(∑
tot +ki
2m
)2
]
−
[∑
in
2m
−
(∑
tot
2m
)2
−
(
ki
2m
)2
]
(C3)
where
∑
in is the sum of the weights of the edges (i.e., the similarities) within the cluster c,
and
∑
tot is the sum of the weights of the edges attaching to nodes in cluster c, while ki is
the sum of the weights of the edges received by node i and ki,in is the sum of the weights
of the edges from i to nodes belonged to cluster c, and m is the total sum of the weights
of all the edges in the system. Therefore, in the second phase the algorithm builds a new
hierarchical partition in which nodes are here those clusters identified in the previous step,
27 Each component of the vector can be weighted according to the importance of that variable to the assessment
of similarities among pairs of institutions. However, we adopt a neutral approach and we treat all information
in the vector with the same importance to avoid ex-ante manipulation for the results.
28 This part refers to the original paper by Blondel et al. (2008). We rely on their formulation for presenting
the main characteristics of the algorithm. For a deep review of community detection methodologies, see e.g.
Fortunato (2010).
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meaning that it re-applies the same procedure of the first phase to the resulting weighted
system of meta-nodes. This approach is iterated until a maximum of modularity is achieved.
Cosine similarities can actually assume positive or negative values (this is due to the
fact that balance sheet items may be either positive or negative). The Louvain community
detection algorithm requires that edges with higher values are assigned to stronger similarities.
Therefore, we first get a distance metrics applying the metric preserving transformation
θi, j =
√
0.5(1 − C Si, j ), where θi, j ∈ [0, 1] and C Si, j is the cosine similarity between i
and j, which ensures that similarities range between 0 and 1 (van Dongen and Enright 2012).
Then, we define the value of pair-wise similarity between (i, j) as 1 − θi, j , so that pairs of
institutions which are very similar receive higher weights. This approach is in line with Puliga
et al. (2016), where a similar clustering strategy is applied to classify a smaller set of banks
than ours and to detect the main economic features characterizing the emerging communities
and with Flori et al. (2019) where a similar approach is applied to detect distinctive behavioral
traits among investment funds.
A few technical issues should be taken into account. First, for each year we prune the
system by removing the edges below the 0.025 and above the 99.975 percentiles of the
cosine similarity distribution. Second, since the system is very dense by construction, we
remove redundant edges avoiding its fragmentation, i.e. keeping the system connected. We
test several specifications by filtering edges below certain thresholds.29 We recall that edges
with higher values stand for higher similarity between pairs of institutions and the goal of
the algorithm is to find clusters of similar institutions. We rely on the idea of finding such
dense system in an Erdos-Renyi random graph, that is we maximize H =
∑
c Mc D(pc||p),
where Mc stands for the number of possible edges in the community c (i.e., nc (nc − 1)/2),
pc is the density of the community c, p is the general density of the graph and D(x ||y) is
the binary Kullback-Leibler divergence (see Traag et al. 2013). Finally, among values of H
which are candidates for being the maximum, we usually prefer those that present higher
values of modularity unless it implies a tight pruning of the edges.
In addition, we provide a further analysis of the emerging clusters by testing the dis-
tributions of their constituents. We employ non-parametric equality of medians tests (i.e.,
Kruskal–Wallis test) to verify whether clusters originate from the same distribution. We con-
sider a wide set of variables and test non-parametrically whether clusters differentiate from
each other for each year in the interval from 2005 to 2014. Results indicate the presence
of differences in medians which we have further analysed by means of post-hoc multiple
pairwise comparisons (i.e., Dunn tests). Test results are available from the authors upon
request.
Our choice of the algorithm to detect peer groups reflects the aim to rely on a clustering
approach that is in line with previous and established literature on peer group identification.
Both the Louvain and the Ward methods are hierarchical clustering algorithms and the quan-
tities they maximize to find clusters are somehow similar (modularity vs. between/within
variances). Moreover, the non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis tests to detect differences among
clusters and the multiple pairwise post-hoc comparisons, which we use to further verify that
groups are distinct, resemble the Pseudo-F Index framework used in Ward to identify the
best configuration of clusters.
29 In particular, we filter the system according to thresholds from 0.7 to 0.5 using a decreasing step equals to
0.025 and, for each year, we select the threshold which maximizes the significance of the configuration.
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D Geographic distribution of peer groups
In this Appendix the geographic distribution of business strategy peer groups is presented.
Evidence from Fig. 1 confirms a good coverage of all peer groups across major countries.
The latter have been selected on the basis of the representation of institutions and geographic
regions in our dataset. Note that the two non-core groups D and E were only adopted in the
first 2 years of our pre-crisis period. Banks adopting those models migrated to groups B and
A respectively in 2007 as reported in Appendix E. In order to provide more sensible average
values of the pre-crisis period, Fig. 1 aggregates non-core models with core ones according
to the similarity and migration features of 2007.
E Transitions across business strategy peer groups
In this Appendix we focus on the transitions of financial institutions across peer groups.
Knowing that institutions tend to belong to the same peer groups over time, i.e. a very low
transition probability, would validate our identification of peer groups.
Figure 2 exhibits that institutions tend to persist in the same peer group during the bien-
nium 2005–2006, while the disappearance of both groups D and E in 2007 determined a
migration of these banks into the three core business strategies. Consistently with their fund-
ing orientations, institutions belonging to group D and E in 2006 migrated mainly to the other
two available wholesale-oriented models, i.e. groups A and B. We note that almost all group
E institutions (98.2%) moved to the group A, most probably for the assets side diversification
that the group A model offers to institutions that used to have 73% of their assets invested
in retail loans (see Table 6). A different dynamics affects institutions in group D, which pre-
dominantly migrated to group B due to the similarity between their assets structures. Only
16.7% of group D institutions moved to group A and, as expected, just a few (3.8%) converted
drastically to the deposit-oriented peer group C.
Table 11 provides the membership stability over time, that is the percentage of institutions
that were in the same peer group from the previous year. With an average of almost 90%,
membership to peer group seems to be quite stable over the period 2005–2014, thus con-
firming that these business strategies are basically composed by a constant set of institutions
during the reference period. This result also validates the effectiveness of our peer group
assessment on the inter-temporal dimension. We also notice a breakpoint in correspondence
of the collapse of 2007. In this year the three core business strategies, and especially the
wholesale-oriented groups, were contaminated by the inflows of institutions from the other
two groups.30 Wholesale-oriented business strategies are those more affected by the inclu-
sion of institutions belonging to different groups in the biennium prior to the crisis, however
percentages shown in Table 11 indicate that still in 2007 these business strategies maintain a
high proportion of members that belonged in 2006 to the same peer groups.
Finally, it is worth underlining that stability of peer groups over time in terms of balance
sheets characteristics is obviously a high desirable requirement for a reasonable classification
approach, although a certain degree of variability might be due to the normal updating process
of banking activities. Since this sample period includes one of the most significant event in the
sustainability of the financial markets, it seems realistic that institutions reacted differently
30 Although one might argue that the resulting three groups in 2007 and hereinafter are no longer the same as
the ones emerged in 2005–2006, we still observe a reasonable continuity in the distributions of balance sheet
values around the crisis of 2007.
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Fig. 1 Geographic coverage of peer groups in the pre-crisis period (average values 2005–2007). The plot
shows the representation of banking peer groups within major countries and geographic areas, including
Islamic and off-shore financial centers. Percentage values are calculated among all banks classified by our
clustering method, averaged across the 3 years 2005–2007. The sample covers more than 90% of banks’ total
assets of the country, enhancing the representation of the countries banking system in our analysis. ISO code-2
is used for countries identifications. Starting from the top we have United States (US), Canada (CA), Great
Britain (GB) and Switzerland (CH); for West European countries we have Germany (DE), France (FR), Spain
(ES) and Italy (IT); for East Europe Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Slovenia (SI) and
Slovakia (SK); for Asia: China (CN), Honk Kong (HK), Japan (JP), India (IN) and Russian Federation (RU);
for Latin America: Argentina (AR), Colombia (CO), Brazil (BR) and Mexico (MX); for Islamic countries:
United Arab Emirates (AE), Bahrain (BH), Kuwait (KW) and Saudi Arabia (SA); for the off-shores financial
centers we have Bermuda (BM), Bahamas (BS), Cayman Islands (KY), Mauritius (MU) and Panama (PA).
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own elaborations
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Fig. 2 Business strategy transitions. The plot shows the percentages of institutions belonging to a certain peer
group in one period and switching to another group in the next period. Plot on left refers to switches from
2005 to 2006, while plot on the right is for transitions from 2006 to 2007. Source: Authors’ own elaborations
from the past against the deteriorated market conditions and that business models have been
greatly influenced by the wave of financial turmoil. This, in turn, poses several issues in
the recognition of consistent peer groups and in the assessment of the coherence of these
groups over time. In particular, before the breakdown of financial market in 2007 institutions
experienced a high level of deregulation and financial innovation, while after the onset of the
crisis the establishment of a new regulatory framework (e.g., the Basel III regulations and the
Dodd-Frank Act) as well as macro and micro prudential decisions pointed to a more robust
and regulated financial system. Our results indicate the presence of three main peer groups
which persist during the entire interval 2005–2014 and that present quite stable balance sheet
figures.
F Robustness checks
To investigate the risk of distress across different business strategies, we present in Table 12
the same regression models as shown in Table 9 but where (i) we admit the presence of one
missing value in the computation of average values for predictors and (ii) we replace missing
values for macro and sectoral variables with geographical aggregated proxies. Results are
in line with those shown in Table 9, with estimates slightly more significant for macro and
sectoral predictors and less for CAMELS.
Although we are aware that a proper econometric analysis for groups D and E should
consider a smaller list of predictors, we still estimate the model for these groups to provide
comparisons with the A and C core peer groups. We also add group B whose few distress
events, mainly concentrated in US, makes the estimation not well defined. For these institu-
tions we also exploit additional data from FDIC to compute the predictors and enlarge the list
of distressed institutions. Group D has a negative and significant coefficient for Net Interest
Margin, while the coefficient for Total Assets is positive and significant; for group E insti-
tutions we observe less consistency with the other wholesale-oriented models and stronger
roles for control variables. We remark that due to the small number of observations and the
absence of a sufficient set of distressed institutions, results for the last two models should
be taken with caution. Furthermore, even in this approximated scenario, estimates are quite
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Table 13 Distress assessment: capital adequacy Column (1) refers to the reference model Selected shown
in Table 8
Dependent variable
Distress
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept −0.632 0.071 −0.467
(0.473) (0.615) (0.549)
C Capital −0.010
(0.013)
C Tier 1 −0.002
(0.006)
C Total Capital Ratio −0.001
(0.003)
AROA −0.217∗∗ −0.047 −0.234∗
(0.098) (0.088) (0.138)
M ROE 0.035∗∗∗ 0.012 0.022
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
E Net interest margin −0.070 −0.099 −0.065
(0.052) (0.076) (0.071)
L Deposits to total funding −0.022∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
STotal securities to total assets 0.004 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
GDP per Capita −0.605∗∗∗ −0.011 0.128
(0.215) (0.255) (0.185)
Inflation 0.415∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.124) (0.102)
Unemployment 0.078∗ 0.030 0.030
(0.041) (0.049) (0.046)
Banks NPLs to gross loans −0.400∗∗∗ −0.415∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.093) (0.085)
Market index −0.073∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.022)
Sector index 0.026∗∗ 0.012 0.011
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Observations 6584 2015 2215
Log likelihood −569.985 −314.442 −332.892
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1165.970 654.884 691.784
Column (2) is the model in which Capital Adequacy is proxied by the Tier 1 ratio, while in column (3) we
consider the Total Capital Ratio
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 14 Distress assessment: asset quality Column (1) refers to the reference model Selected shown in
Table 8
Dependent variable
Distress
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept −0.632 −0.255 0.069
(0.473) (0.575) (0.620)
C Capital −0.010 −0.024 −0.080∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.034)
AROA −0.217∗∗
(0.098)
AImpaired loans to gross loans 0.029∗∗
(0.014)
ALoan loss reserves to impaired loans −0.002∗∗
(0.001)
M ROE 0.035∗∗∗ 0.014 0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
E Net interest margin −0.070 0.015 0.050
(0.052) (0.031) (0.031)
L Deposits to total funding −0.022∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
STotal securities to total assets 0.004 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
GDP per capita −0.605∗∗∗ 0.104 −0.037
(0.215) (0.196) (0.228)
Inflation 0.415∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.086) (0.097)
Unemployment 0.078∗ 0.081∗ 0.057
(0.041) (0.045) (0.045)
Banks NPLs to gross loans −0.400∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.130) (0.140)
Market index −0.073∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.061∗∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.026)
Sector index 0.026∗∗ −0.015 −0.013
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 6584 2854 2454
Log likelihood −569.985 −335.968 −288.998
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1165.970 697.935 603.997
Column (2) is the model in which Asset Quality is proxied by the Impaired Loans to Gross Loans, while in
column (3) we consider the Loan Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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coherent between the Wholesale-oriented* model and the Wholesale-oriented* (Restricted)
model.
This Appendix also presents variants of the risk assessment models seen in Sect. 5. In
particular, Table 13 shows two alternative models in which instead of Capital (column 1), the
Capital Adequacy is proxied by the Tier 1 (column 2) or the Total Capital Ratio (column 3).
These two alternative models provide overall estimates in line with those discussed in column
(1), thus supporting our main findings reported in the manuscript in Sect. 5 where we observe
a marginal role of Capital in explaining the risk of distress. In addition, Table 14 reports the
case in which Asset Quality is measured by the Impaired Loans to Gross Loans (column 2)
or the Loan Loss Reserves to Impaired Loans (column 3), instead of ROA (column 1). Even
in this case, a better quality of the assets is likely to reduce the likelihood of distress thus
confirming our main findings. Both Tables 13 and 14 report, therefore, alternative models in
which the risk of distress is assessed by means of accounting-based indicators that are better
able to map CAMELS dimensions, but unfortunately with a more limited sample coverage.
Although for these cases the sample size decreases substantially (thus further motivating
the use of a rare-event logistic regression), still we notice that the main findings are largely
confirmed.
The last Table 15 compares our “Selected” model (column 1) with three variants in which
we include the interaction effects between ROA and both Capital and ROE. These are meant
to explore potential interaction effects impacting ROA that may take place and go beyond
a simple linear relationship with the other two variables. As shown in columns 2–4, these
additional regressors do not modify substantially the econometric estimation provided by the
“Selected” model. Indeed, both the selected CAMELS variables and the Macro/Sector con-
trols are largely confirmed in terms of significance, sign and magnitude of the corresponding
betas. We also test if the main conclusions of the Selected model are confirmed once we rely
on a more parsimonious setup. In column 5 we start by dropping the three regressors and we
note that the remaining regressors have coefficients that are largely in line with those of the
Selected model (column 1). In the following models (columns 6–8), instead, we include each
regressor only one at a time. Note how, again, the set of the Macro/Sector controls remain
very stable, and similarly the remaining CAMELS variables are largely unaffected. Specifi-
cally, capital (column 6) becomes significant but the sign and magnitude are very similar to
those of the Selected model; and ii) ROE coefficient in column 8 is confirmed in terms of
significance, sign, and magnitude.
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